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The Epic Struggle for Dolphin-Safe
Tuna: To Be Continued-A Case for
Nonprotectionist
Accommodating
Eco-labels in the WTO
ABSTRACT

In May 2012, the World Trade Organization(WTO) struck
down the United States' dolphin-safe tuna labeling standard as
a barrierto trade that is prohibited by the Technical Barriersto
Trade Agreement (TBT). The analysis in the US-Tuna II report
questions the validity of standardized eco-labels enforced by
WTO Member States, which are an increasingly popular means
to achieve environmental and consumer protection. This Note
considers the merits of state-backed eco-labeling schemes, the
implications of the US-Tuna II report for the WTO's approach to
nontrade interests, and potential accommodations within the
current WTO framework for eco-labels. It ultimately suggests
that WTO dispute resolution bodies depart from US-Tuna II;
instead of rejecting environmental legislation that has any
discriminatory effect upon trade, future decisions should
concentrate upon whether the statute is intended to serve a
protectionist purpose. It also suggests that the WTO consider
awarding monetary aid to ease developing nations' financial or
technological burdens in complying with upheld regulations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In May 2012, the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) struck down the United States' dolphin-safe
tuna labeling standards as a violation of the Technical Barriers to
Trade Agreement (TBT). The dolphin-safe tuna label's standards
were set in the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act
(DPCIA), which mandated that sellers use the label only if their
products were caught by proscribed fishing methods.' The standards
themselves were the enormously popular product of a decade of
legislative drafting, agency interpretation, and court review.2

1.
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (1990).
2.
See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Concerning the
Importation,Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 1 172, WTIDS381/ABIR
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In United States-Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US-Tuna 11), the
WTO Appellate Body (Appellate Body)3 held that the United States'
dolphin-safe labeling standard was a "technical regulation" and
therefore subject to compliance with the TBT. 4 It then ruled that the
labeling standard violated the TBT because it would affect
international trade; while American producers had already achieved
compliance, the majority of Mexican vessels engage in fishing
methods that disqualify them from using the dolphin-safe labels.5 In
addition, the Appellate Body examined the scientific data Congress
itself used when determining eco-labeling standards were necessary
but found the evidence did not justify the legislation.6 The Appellate
Body did not inquire into whether the DPCIA was enacted with a
discriminatory purpose.7
The US-Tuna II case has potentially far-reaching implications
for state-enforced eco-labeling standards. First, if the WTO upholds
its interpretation of the TBT going forward, the decision confirms
academic suspicion that all state-backed eco-labeling standards will
likely fall within the provisions of the TBT. At the time of writing,
over nineteen individual states have enacted green-labeling

(May 16, 2012) [hereinafter US-Tuna II AB] (describing the process involved in
creating the standards). Contra Appellate Body Report, US-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle].
3.
This Note often references the WTO's dispute resolution processes. The
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) governs dispute resolution mechanisms for
WTO members. If it believes another member has breached its WTO obligations, a
WTO member must first initiate consultations with the breaching member. If these
mediations fail, the complainant member may request a Panel be set up to hear its
dispute. The Panel, which is usually composed of three or five individuals nominated
by the WTO Secretariat, decides whether the complainant is correct based upon
pleadings of the member parties, as well as oral arguments and outside fact-finding.
The Panel then issues its decision in a written report (Panel Report). Either member
can appeal its legal findings to the Appellate Body. In any given dispute, three of the
seven members of the Appellate Body will hear the dispute; for ease, this Note refers to
these three members as the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body then issues its own
report (Appellate Body Report) with its legal findings. If it loses its appeal, a defendant
member must follow the recommendations of the Panel Report or Appellate Body
Report in order to bring itself back into compliance with WTO obligations within a
reasonable period of time. If it fails to do so, then the member parties may determine
mutually-acceptable compensation, such as tariff reductions or compensatory aid. A
helpful summary of the dispute resolution process within the WTO is available at the
WTO's website. See Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, THE WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto e/whatis e/tif e/disp le.htm [http://perma.cc/
YQ7B-JMHT] (archived Feb. 13, 2014) (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see also RALPH H.
FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BuSINEss TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED
COURSEBOOK 356-58 (11th ed. 2012).
4.
US-Tuna II AB, supra note 2, 1 407.
5.
Id. 1234.
6.
Id. 407.
7.
Id.
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standards or guidance, and eco-labeling has generally garnered
support as a market-based means of promoting environmental
conservation.8 If the WTO's judicial bodies hold to the interpretation
of the TBT's provisions in US-Tuna II, it may effectively eliminate
eco-labeling as a tool for achieving nontrade goals.
Second, the case is arguably the product of the WTO's inability to
adopt an official approach to accommodating environmental and
other nontrade interests that have incidental effects on trade.9 USTuna II followed a decade-long stalemate within the WTO regarding
how, or whether, to accommodate regulations that are based upon
environmental interests.' 0 The effects of this dissension continue to
snowball as WTO members enact more environmental regulation,
and accordingly face a growing number of complaints under the
TBT. 1
Third, the decision arguably presents a turn away from the
WTO's recent attempts to accommodate nontrade interests within its
framework. Like other WTO agreements, the TBT recognizes that its
members have the right to enact environmental regulations.12 Yet in
US-Tuna II, the Appellate Body did not consider whether the ecolabel was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. If this analysis is
broadly applied, WTO members will be unable to apply marketing
standards to foreign suppliers that do not already practice the desired
production methods; effectively, adherence to the WTO's
interpretation of the TBT would limit countries' ability to protect
consumers from foreign producers' potentially deceptive labels and

8.
Product Category List by Country, GLOBAL ECO-LABELING NETWORK,
http://www.globalecolabelling.net/categories-7 criteriallist by-country/index.htm
[http://perma.ccNC9Y-E2UH] (archived Feb. 13, 2014) (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). The
list also includes regional organizations, including the European Union, Nordic
Countries, and North America.
This Note asserts that state-backed eco-label schemes are defensible on the
9.
grounds of both environmental and consumer protection.
10.
See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge:
Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and
Environment Issues, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2001) (discussing the criticism
the WTO faced in the 1990s).
11.
See Samir R. Gandhi, Regulating the Use of Voluntary Environmental
Standards Within the World Trade Organization Legal Regime: Making a Case for
Developing Countries, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 855, 856 (2005) (noting that from 2000 to
2003, WTO member countries notified the WTO of 268 environment-related
requirements; during the same period, the annual number of notifications increased
from 59 to 89).
See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, at pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994,
12.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 27 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter TBT Agreement] ("Recognizing that no country should be prevented from
taking measures necessary to ensure the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, of the environment.").
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encourage purchases from producers who achieve environmental
objectives.
This Note examines the value of state-backed eco-labeling
schemes, the potential implications of US-Tuna II for the WTO's
approach to accommodating nontrade interests, and potential
adjustments within the current WTO framework for eco-labels. Part
II describes the Appellate Body's reasoning in US-Tuna H. Part III
examines the merits and criticism of state-standardized eco-labels
from an economic and policy perspective. Part IV considers the
implications of US-Tuna II within the context of the WTO's attempts
to accommodate nontrade interests.
Ultimately, this Note suggests in Part V that the WTO
accommodate members' regulations, including state-mandated ecolabeling schemes, which are not based upon protectionist interests.
Rather than waiting for the diplomatic body 13 to reform its
agreements, the WTO adjudicatory bodies 14 should abandon the
Appellate Body's precedent in US-Tuna II when interpreting the
TBT. Part V also suggests that WTO adjudicatory bodies award
monetary aid to challengers of legitimate environmental regulations,
thereby promoting conservation efforts extraterritorially and
reducing trade barriers.

II. US-TUNA H: A CASE STUDY OF THE WTO's APPROACH TO
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION UNDER THE TBT

A. Legislative and Judicial History of the DPCL4
The DPCIA demonstrates the potential cooperation and conflicts
between domestic policymakers, nongovernmental actors, and
international trade interests. Rather than considering only domestic
requirements for legislative and administrative justification, the
legislative and administrative bodies must ensure their actions
conform to the TBT. The DPCIA's messy history of legislative
administrative
and
redrafting,
invalidation,
enactment,
interpretation demonstrates that it is likely difficult for all
governmental actors to prioritize WTO compliance when they already
face a plethora of domestic environmental and trade interests.

In order to distinguish from its dispute resolution bodies, this Note uses the
13.
term "diplomatic body" to refer to the WTO's function as an international forum for its
members. The WTO's formal agreements are adopted only by consensus of all
members. See Whose WTO Is It Anyway?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto elwhatis e/tif e/orgl-e.htm [http://perma.cc/8BE5-AF39] (archived Feb.
13, 2014) (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (indicating that all major decisions are normally
taken by consensus).
14.
This Note refers to the Appellate Body and future Panels as "adjudicatory
bodies."
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The demand for dolphin-safe tuna emerged from concern about
staggering dolphin fatalities resulting from bycatch in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific (ETP). 15 In that region, dolphins and yellowfin tuna
have a unique ecological association; the two species travel together
throughout that expanse, and dolphins' surfacing makes their
movement visible above the surface. 16 Since the 1950s, fishermen
used this association to their advantage by "setting on" dolphins;
fishermen track pods of dolphins in order to locate tuna schools and
then use purse seine nets to ensnare the entire school.' 7 The dolphins
are often caught as bycatch; they can be released manually, but this
takes time and effort, and even then is sometimes not successful.
During the 1970s, the public became aware of the high dolphin
mortality rates, estimated at that time to be in the hundreds of
thousands per year.18
The United States' first attempt to alter tuna-fishing methods
took the form of an outright ban upon any tuna imports that did not
comply with domestic standards; these standards required that
dolphin kills associated with tuna catches decrease to "insignificant
levels" and regulatory dolphin protection programs.' 9 The Marine
Mammal Protection Act arguably created the public's demand for
dolphin-safe tuna.2 0 That legislation was challenged by Mexico under

15.
See The Tuna-Dolphin Issue, SOUTHWEST FISHERIES SCIENCE CENTER,
http://swfsc.noaa.gov/textblock.aspx?Division=PRD&ParentMenuld=228&id=1408
[http://perma.cc/QJP3-BY6Q] (archived Feb. 13, 2014) [hereinafter The Tuna-Dolphin
Issue] ("The number of dolphins killed since the fishery began in the late 1950s is
estimated to be over 6 million animals, the highest known for any fishery.").
16.
See id. (explaining that fishermen locate schools of tuna by chasing down
the dolphins that swim with schools and set nets around them, catching the dolphins
along with tuna).
17.
Id.; Conservation: Threats to the Bottlenose Dolphin and Other Marine
Mammals, THE DOLPHIN INSTITUTE, http://www.dolphin-institute.org/resource-guide/
conservation.htm [http://perma.cc/G3E2-4JVB] (archived Feb. 13, 2014).
18.
See Elisabeth Eaves, Dolphin-Safe But Not Ocean-Safe, FORBES (June 24,
2008, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/24/dolphin-safe-tuna-tech-paperplastic
08-cx ee 0724fishing.html [http://perma.cc/XA5Z-598P] (archived Feb. 5, 2014) ("The
save-the-dolphins campaign that began in the 1970s initially met with huge success. It
helped reduce dolphin deaths in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) from something
well above a hundred thousand per year to just a few thousand by the mid-'90s.").
19.
See U.S. Enforces Tuna Embargo, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/03/business/us-enforces-tuna-embargo.html
[http://perma.cc/8SN4-K9EZ] (archived Feb. 22, 2014) (noting that when the act was
first enforced, the embargo covered yellowfin tuna harvested by fishermen from Mexico
and Venezuela, and imports from 22 countries). For a brief but thorough history of the
United States' regulation of the dolphin-safe tuna legislation, consult Donald W.
McChesney, Dolphin-Safe or Fisherman-Friendly?Abuse of Discretion in Amendment of
the Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Standard, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1725, 1728-44
(2005).
20.
See Marine Mammal Protection Act and Litigation Highlights, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/enrd/4680.htm
[http://perma.cclZ8VB-ZMJS]
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 2 1 In United

States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (US-Tuna 1),

22

GATT's

appellate judicial body found the regulation to be an invalid
restriction on interstate trade.2 3 The public's response was nothing
short of an outcry, and Congress echoed popular concerns regarding
GATT's inability to accommodate environmental and health
concerns. 24
The demand for dolphin-safe tuna increased through the efforts
of environmental activist groups, including the Earth Island
Institute, an American not-for-profit conservation organization. 25
Earth Island encouraged the U.S. tuna industry to end the
controversial practice of using purse seine nets to capture tuna.2 6
Within 4 years, the world's three largest tuna producers, all U.S.
corporations, agreed to stop selling tuna caught by the intentional
chasing and netting of dolphins. 27 Earth Island also created and
monitored the use of its own dolphin-safe eco-label.2 8
Partially in response to the deceptive use of dolphin-safe labels,
Congress enacted the DPCIA in 1990. 29 The choice to federally
standardize dolphin-safe tuna labels coincided with a broader
movement to regulate environmental advertising. 30 The DPCIA

(archived Feb. 22, 2014) (noting that the Marine Mammal Protection Act banned the
practice of setting on dolphins and thus created "the market for 'dolphin-safe' tuna").
21.
"GATT" is used to refer both to the treaty and its members, which met for
nine rounds between 1947 and 1994. In 1995, the treaty was amended to create the
WTO. The WTO Appellate Body is a descendant of GATT's appellate judicial body. See
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154; The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis-e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm [http://perma.cc/CU2E3W5C] (archived Feb. 22, 2014) (providing a brief history of GATT and the WTO).
Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WT/DS29/R
22.
(June 16, 1994) [hereinafter US-Tuna I].
23.
See id.
57 (concluding that the import prohibitions on tuna and tuna
products in the Marine Mammal Protection Act failed to conform with GATT
requirements).
24.
JACQUELINE D. KRIKORIAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND DOMESTIC
POLICY: CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE WTO 8-9 (2013).

25.
See Questions and Answers About Earth Island Institute's Dolphin Safe
Tuna Program, EARTH ISLAND
INSTITUTE,
http://www.earthisland.org/immp/
QandAdolphinSafe.html [http://perma.cc/KV5B-HWKQI (archived Feb. 22, 2014)
(detailing the mission of the Earth Island Institute).
Id.
26.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
See Food and Agric. Org., Product Certification and Eco-labeling for
Fisheries Sustainability 16 (FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 422, 2001) [hereinafter
FAO Report], available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y2789e/y2789e00.pdf (last
visited Mar. 14, 2014) (explaining that the U.S. Congress passed the DPCIA to make
the government responsible for verifying that tuna products are dolphin-safe);
McChesney, supra note 19, at 1731 ("In 1990, Congress passed the Dolphin Protection
Consumer Information Act ('DCPIA') in furtherance of the MMPA's goals.").
See FAO Report, supra note 29, at 10 (describing the eco-labeling regulatory
30.
scheme used by the Food and Agriculture Organization). Notably, in 1992, the Federal
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provided that tuna would be eligible for dolphin-safe labels only if
producers certified that they did not set on dolphins. 3 ' It placed an
additional eligibility requirement upon sellers of tuna from the ETP:
producers in that region must also certify that "no dolphins were
killed or seriously injured in the nets in which the tuna were
caught."3 2 Congress based its regional differentiation upon the strong
ecological association between tuna and dolphins that is unique to the
ETP; it found that dolphins were especially vulnerable within that
region.3 3
The DPCIA's strict requirements caused U.S. trade partners,
including Mexico, to protest the legislation. 34 The United States and
these countries subsequently created a multilateral agreement, the
International Dolphin Conservation Program, in which all parties
agreed to limit dolphin mortality to set quotas. 35 In exchange, the

Trade Commission first issued its green guides, which provided marketers with
standards for all environmental marketing claims, and consumers with tools to
interpret them. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims 16 C.F.R. §
260 (2010); Environmentally Friendly Products: FTC's Green Guides, FED. TRADE
COMM'N (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/ opa/reporter/advertising/greenguides.shtml
[http://perma.ccl4VQR-UL2E] (archived Feb. 22, 2014); see also Jennifer Woods, Note,
Of Selling the Environment - Buyer Beware? An Evaluation of the Proposed F.T.C.
Green Guides Revisions, 21 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 75, 75 (2008) ("[T]he Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) established the Green Guides (Guides) in 1992 to assist companies
in determining appropriate means for making claims about the environmental benefits
of their products.").
31.
Elizabeth Trujillo, The WTO Appellate Body Knocks Down U.S. "DolphinSafe" Tuna Labels But Leaves a Crack for PPMs, 16 ASIL INSIGHTS 25 (July 26, 2012),
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/25/wto-appellate-body-knocksdown-us-%E2%80%9Cdolphin-safe%E2%80%9D-tuna-labels-leaves
[http://perma.ce/WRF3-VYP2] (archived Feb. 22, 2014) ("For tuna caught in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific region ('ETP'), access to the label requires a certification that
the tuna was not caught by setting on dolphins and that 'no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured' in the process."); see also US-Tuna II AB, supra note 2, 1 172 ("[Tuna
caught by 'setting on' dolphins is currently not eligible for a 'dolphin-safe' label in the
United States.").
US-Tuna II AB, supra note 2, 174.
32.
33.
See The Tuna-Dolphin Issue, supra note 15 ("The bycatch of dolphins in the
eastern tropical Pacific (ETP) purse-seine tuna fishery stands apart from marine
mammal bycatch in other fisheries, not only in scale but in the way the dolphins
interact with the fishery.").
34.
See generally Panel Report, United States-Restrictionson Imports of Tuna,
WT[DS21 (Sept. 3, 1991) (ruling that a ban on imports based upon non-physical
attributes violated GATT Article XI, and that SPS did not provide an exception because
the regulation affected extraterritorial environmental practices).
35.
See McChesney, supra note 19, at 1731-32 ("The La Jolla Agreement
established the International Dolphin Conservation Program ('IDCP') in which
participating nations agreed to adopt dolphin mortality limits. Under these mortality
limits, each vessel from a signatory country's tuna fleet could not exceed a set number
of dolphin deaths."); see also La Jolla Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality
in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, June 1992, 1 U.S.T. 230, 33 I.L.M. 936 (1994).
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Clinton administration agreed to seek a congressional lift of the
DPCIA's embargo.3 6
Congress hesitated to abandon its strict provisions within the
DPCIA, which had reduced dolphin mortality significantly.3 7 In 1997,
Congress allowed that if the secretary of commerce found scientific
evidence that the fishing industry in the ETP did not have an adverse
impact on the dolphin population, then Congress could reduce the
region's regulatory burden. 38 In his analysis, the secretary of
commerce weighed Mexico's trade concerns, despite the fact that
Congress did not permit him to consider economic or international
consequences.3 9 The secretary twice asserted that the fishery had no
impact upon dolphin populations, and the Ninth Circuit twice struck
down his findings as arbitrary and capricious. 40 In its second
decision, Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, the Ninth Circuit ordered
that the DPCIA should continue in force. 4 '
After the Hogarth decision, Mexico requested WTO consultations
with the United States to challenge the DPCIA, related regulations,
and Hogarth as violations of the TBT; when negotiations failed, it
requested adjudication by a WTO Panel.4 2 In particular, its complaint
challenged the DPCIA's differentiation between tuna caught in the
ETP and all other regions. 43

36.
President's Transmittal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI to the U.S.
Senate with Commentary, 34 I.L.M. 1393 (1995).
37.
See McChesney, supra note 19, at 1733-34 (citing Brower v. Daley, 93 F.
Supp. 2d 1071, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2000)) (noting that between 1992 and 1998, the annual
estimated dolphin fatalities decreased from 15,550 to 1,900).
38.
See Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 2007)
("According to the bill's proponents, Congress would weaken the then-strict tuna
labeling requirements, and permit broader use of 'dolphin-safe' labeling, only if the
Secretary found that the fishery was not having a significant adverse impact on
already depleted dolphin stocks.").
39.
See id. at 768-69 ("[T]he Secretary afforded the Mexican and South
American governments numerous opportunities to bypass the ODP procedures for
submitting comments for agency review and instead plead their case directly to the
highest levels.").
40.
See id. at 763-66 ("Congress still does not have the answer to the
fundamental question outlined in the IDCPA almost a decade ago, as to whether the
fishery produces stress effects on the dolphins that prevent population recovery.").
41.
See id. at 766 (rejecting the district court's order to enforce the DPCIA's
former embargo, and instead ruling that dolphin-safe tuna label standards comply with
DPCIA).
42.
See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS381 United States-Measures
Concerning the Importation,Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds381-e.htm
[http://perma.cc/WYP-3FJR] (archived Feb. 22, 2014) (providing a brief recounting of
the proceedings).
43.
See id. ("Mexico's main claims were that the measures were discriminatory,
and that they were also unnecessary.").
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B. The Labeling Standard as a Technical Regulation
The threshold matter in the Appellate Body's decision in USTuna II was whether the DPCIA 44 created a technical regulation
subject to the TBT. 4 5 The TBT defines a technical regulation as a
"[d]ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related
processes and production methods . .. with which compliance is

mandatory . .. "46 It further clarifies that the regulation may deal
exclusively with "labeling requirements as they apply to a product,
process or production method." 47 The United States asserted that the
labeling scheme was not a technical regulation because use of the
label was not mandatory. 4 8
The Appellate Body found the Mexican government's challenge
persuasive. The Mexican government argued that the regulation was
mandatory because it restricted retailers "to a single choice" for
labeling tuna products as dolphin safe. 4 If the dolphin-safe
requirements were not met, tuna packaging could not include any
references to dolphins or other marine mammals.5 0 In effect, the
DPCIA presumes that any mention of dolphin safety on tuna labels is
deceptive unless it meets DPCIA requirements. 5 ' In interpreting the

44.
In analyzing the dolphin safe labeling, the WTO Panel and Appellate
Body's analysis considered the DPCIA, 16 U.S.C. § 1385, the implementing regulations,
50 C.F.R. § 216.91, and the 9th Circuit ruling in Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, as a
unit. See US-Tuna II, supra note 2, 1 172. For ease, this Note refers to the entire
regulatory scheme as the DPCIA.
45.
The TBT is a WTO Agreement aimed at reducing unnecessary obstacles to
trade, including regulatory standards; it does this by requiring that all "technical
regulations" do not impose undue obstacles to international competition. The TBT
recognizes that members still retain the right to achieve "legitimate policy objectives,
such as the protection of human health and safety, or the environment." See Technical
Barriers to Trade, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
tbt_e/tbte.htm [http://perma.cc/PUQ2-JWJ5] (archived Feb. 5, 2014).
46.
TBT Agreement, supra note 12, at Annex 1; see also Technical Information
on Technical Barriers to Trade, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/tbte/tbtinfo e.htm [http://perma.cc/8RPH-FPJG] (archived Feb. 22, 2014)
[hereinafter WTO Technical Information] ("While conformity with standards is
voluntary, technical regulations are by nature mandatory.").
47.
TBT Agreement, supra note 12, at Annex 1.
48.
The DPCIA does not require that tuna be labeled "dolphin safe" for it to be
sold in the United States. See US-Tuna II AB, supra note 2, 1 181 ("The United States
takes issue with several aspects of the Panel's analysis, alleging in particular that the
Panel erred in its interpretation of the word 'mandatory' by making it
indistinguishable from the term 'requirement'.").
49.
Id. 1 182.
50.
See id. 172 ("The DPCIA and the implementing regulations also prohibit
any reference to dolphins, porpoises, or marine mammals on the label of a tuna product
if the tuna contained in the product does not comply with the labeling conditions
spelled out in the DPCIA.").
51.
See id. 1 195 ("Rather, the measure at issue establishes that including on
the label of a tuna product the term 'dolphin-safe' [ . .. ] without meeting the conditions
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definition of technical regulation, the Appellate Body determined that
the appropriate inquiry may "involve considering whether the
measure . . . sets out specific requirements that constitute the sole

means of addressing a particular matter . .". 52 As a result, it ruled
the DPCIA a technical regulation because it "covers the entire field of
what 'dolphin-safe' means in relation to tuna products." 53

C. DPCL4 as a Violation of the "no less favored nation"Requirement
The Appellate Body held that the DPCIA violated Article 2.1 of
the TBT, which requires that technical regulations ensure that all
imports from WTO Member States "shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that" given to like products of any other origin. 54
The United States argued that Mexican tuna was not treated
differently under the DPCIA because its regulation differentiated
between tuna's regional origin (the ETP versus all other seas), rather
than the producer's origin.55
The Appellate Body again rejected the United States'
interpretation of the treaty. Instead, it held that less favorable
treatment results when a regulation modifies the conditions of
competition that have a detrimental impact upon Mexican products. 5 6
The fact that consumers were free to purchase tuna without the
dolphin-safe label was irrelevant.5 7 The Appellate Body noted that
most Mexican-produced tuna would not qualify for dolphin-safe labels
under the DPCIA. At least two-thirds of Mexican vessels set on
dolphins5 8 and therefore were effectively unable to produce dolphinsafe tuna under the DPCIA; in contrast, the American fleet did not

set forth in the measure, is, in itself, a violation of Section 45 of Title 15 of the United
States Code.").
Id.
188. But see WTO Technical Information, supra note 46 (implying that
52.
the TBT is intended to cover regulations that prevent non-conforming goods to be sold
on the market).
US-Tuna II AB, supra note 2, 199.
53.
TBT Agreement, supra note 12, at art. 2.1.
54.
See US-Tuna II AB, supra note 2, 209 (noting that "for the United States,
55.
the emphasis is on whether a measure modifies the conditions of competition based
upon the origin of imported product").
See id.
231, 235 (defining the test as whether the measure modifies the
56.
conditions of competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products and then finding
the test satisfied because the regulation had a "detrimental impact" because most
Mexican vessels would not comply with the regulation).
238 ("[I]t is the measures themselves that control access to the
57.
See id.
label and allow consumers to express their preferences for dolphin-safe tuna. An
advantage is therefore afforded to products eligible for the label by the measures, in
the form of access to the label.").
The United States set this type of fishing apart due to its particular
58.
concern that it posed harm to dolphins; "setting on dolphins" involves chasing pods of
dolphins to find tuna schools, and its criticism directly led to the United States'
adoption of tuna labels in the 1980s.
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set on dolphins in the ETP at the time of the legislation's passage.5 9
The Appellate Body held that because evidence showed that U.S.
consumers preferred dolphin-safe tuna, the Mexican fleet's inability
to use the label was detrimental to Mexican tuna producers' ability to
compete in the United States. 60
The Appellate Body also ruled that the detrimental impact on
Mexican tuna "reflected discrimination." 61 The United States
asserted that the more stringent regulations of ETP tuna were
"calibrated" to the differing risks to dolphins arising from different
regional fishing methods. 62 However, the Appellate Body held that
the United States had not satisfied its burden of justifying the
regional differentiation.6 3 While the setting-on method was common
in the ETP and posed a risk to dolphins, 64 it was not clear that
dolphins faced a reduced risk outside the ETP when other fishing
methods were used. 65 Therefore, the United States had not
demonstrated that the regulation was evenhanded. 66
D. US-Tuna II's Result
The Appellate Body's adopted report ultimately required the
United States to amend the DPCIA to comply with the TBT. 67 The
United States and Mexico agreed that the United States would have
until July 13, 2013, to comply with the report's decision. 68 At the time
of writing, the United States had not revealed how it would amend
the DPCIA. If it should fail, the United States would risk facing

Id. 234.
59.
60.
See id. 1 233-38 (noting how the evidence showed that the DPCIA
impeded Mexican tuna producers' ability to compete).
61.
Id. T 298.
Id. 282.
62.
63.
Id. 407.
64.
Id. 251 (summarizing the uncontested factual findings of the Panel).
65.
See id.
258 (upholding the Panel's factual finding); see also id. $ 264
(quoting the Panel opinion) ("[T]here are clear indications that the use of certain tuna
fishing techniques other than setting on dolphins may also cause harm to dolphins.").
66.
Id. T 297. See id. T 292 ("[I]t thus appears that the measure at issue does
not address adverse effects on dolphins resulting from the use of fishing methods
predominantly employed by fishing fleets supplying the United States' and other
countries' tuna producers.").
67.
This recommendation was made by the Appellate Body, US-Tuna II AB,
supra note 2, T 408, and adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body on June 13, 2012,
Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS 381, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds381_e.htm [http://perma.ccl7DXQ-5MWF] (archived
Feb. 12, 2014) (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
Id. (noting that the United States and Mexico reported to the WTO on June
68.
25, 2012, and that they agreed that a "reasonable" time to enact compliance would be
13 months).
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retaliatory trade sanctions granted within the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Understanding.6 9
Yet it is unclear whether the threat of retaliatory trade sanctions
is real. Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, retaliatory
trade sanctions are a last resort. The parties must first exhaust
negotiations to achieve "mutually acceptable compensation."70 Then
the challenging party can request that the WTO authorize retaliatory
trade sanctions. 71 These sanctions must be proportional to the
impairment suffered due to the noncompliance. 72 Moreover, history
suggests that retaliatory trade sanctions are rarely used by WTO
members, especially by smaller trading partners against larger
nations.73

III.

US-TUNA II'S IMPLICATIONS FOR

CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES

A. EmpiricalEvidence on the Debated Success of Eco-Labeling
Eco-labels are seals of approval granted by private or public
organizations to inform consumers about the environmental impact of
a product, usually regarding processes and production methods
(PPMs). 74 They are designed to influence consumers at the point of
sale, thereby employing market forces to pressure producers to
improve their environmental impact. 7 5 The three varieties of ecolabels are defined by their enforcement mechanisms: voluntary selfreporting
standards,
nongovernmental
organization
(NGO)
standards, and state-mandated standards such as the DPCIA's.

69.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
Id.
70.
71.
See id. ("If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed ... any party
having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the
DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other
obligations under the covered agreements.").
72.
See id. at art 22.4 ("The level of the suspension of concessions or other
obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or
impairment.").
73.
See infra Part V (discussing whether retaliatory trade sanctions are an
effective threat against developed nations).
74.
Tavis Potts & Marcus Haward, International Trade, Eco-labeling, and
Sustainable Fisheries - Recent Issues, Concepts and Practices, 9 ENV'T, DEV. &
SUSTAINABILITY 91, 92 (2007). See FAO report, supra note 29, at 10 ("Ecolabels are
seals of approval given to products that are deemed to have fewer impacts on the
environment than functionally or competitively similar products.").
75.
See FAO report, supra note 29, at 10 ("The rationale for basic labelling
information at the point of sale is that it links fisheries products to their production
process.").
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Though eco-labels are praised for their theoretical efficiency,
their actual success in promoting environmental quality is less
certain.76 Market research suggests that eco-labels have increased
consumer awareness of their purchasing habits' environmental
impact,7 7 and consumers report that they are willing to pay more for
environmentally friendly products.78 However, there is little market
evidence available to assess the magnitude of that willingness to pay,
and consumers' actual purchasing habits do not necessarily track
their self-reported preferences. 79
There are some notable examples of eco-labels' success. The
dolphin-safe tuna label is arguably the poster child for eco-labeling's
potential. After the label's creation, the supply of tuna-safe products
increased.8 0 The label also impacted consumers' purchasing habits;
the canned tuna's U.S. market share increased by 1 percent between
1990 and 1995, indicating that consumers substituted away from
competing products that were not eligible for the eco-label. 8 ' There is
also widespread evidence of voluntary labeling mechanisms' success.
Of particular note is the Sierra Club and Earth Land Institute's
"turtle friendly" campaign, created in the wake of the WTO's ShrimpTurtle case, in which the WTO invalidated a U.S. ban on shrimp
turtle-protection
without similar
countries
imports from
regulations. 82 After the United States abandoned its regulation,

See Mario F. Teis1 et al., Can Eco-labels Tune a Market? Evidence from
76.
Dolphin-Safe Labeling, 43 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 339, 340 (2002) (noting how few
studies have actually studied the behavioral effectiveness of eco-labels); ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], PRIVATE VOLUNTARY EcoLABELS: TRADE DISTORTING, DISCRIMINATORY AND ENVIRONMENTALLY DISAPPOINTING 2
[hereinafter OECD REPORT] ("[T]he evidence that such labels are even affecting
positive environmental outcomes is mixed."); Nicolai V. Kuminoff et al., The Growing
Supply of Ecolabeled Seafood: An Economic Perspective, 9 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL'Y 25, 28 (2008) (questioning whether obtaining goals of environmental policy will
lead to improved environmental quality).
See Teisl et al., supra note 76, at 340 (explaining that a change in labeling
77.
can change market behavior).
See id. at 355 ("[If] a significant portion of the consumer population
78.
demands environmentally friendly products, the presence of an eco-labeling program
may provide firms an incentive to differentiate.").
See id. at 340 ("[A] change in awareness does not necessarily translate into
79.
a change in behavior and consumers do not necessarily follow their own purchasing
assertions."); Kuminoff et al., supra note 76, at 27 ("There is almost no market-based
evidence on how consumers have actually reacted to the recent introduction of fresh
and frozen seafood products that have been certified by MSC or other organizations.").
Teis1 et al., supra note 76, at 355.
80.
See id. at 355 ("After the introduction of the label, shares of other products
81.
decreased as people substituted back to tuna, providing an interesting look at how
people substitute between products based on moral or ideological grounds."); Kuminoff
et al., supra note 76, at 26 ("[P]reliminary evidence from supermarket scanner data
suggests that the introduction of the dolphin-safe tuna label increased the market
share of canned tuna by one percent between 1990 and 1995.").
Shrimp-Turtle, supranote 2, 1 187.
82.
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NGOs successfully discouraged supermarkets from purchasing
products that did not conform to standards similar to the United
States'. Within 3 years, more than 75 percent of the U.S. retail
shrimp market was dominated by the turtle friendly label.83
The potential power of information, which drives eco-labels'
success, is also supported by the success of "spotlighting," a
regulatory method that requires companies to disclose their PPMs'
environmental effects to the public. For example, the U.S. Toxic
Release Inventory program, which required firms to disclose their
emissions of toxic chemicals, compelled firms to self-monitor and
"confront disagreeable realities" regarding their own operations. 84 As
a result, the regulated entities decreased the release of the reported
chemicals by 57 percent over a period of 16 years. 85 Studies of a
similar program in Canada suggest that firms with retail market
exposure are more likely to reduce their emissions. 86

B. The Purpose of State-MandatedEco-labeling Standards
International organizations have recognized the potential value
of eco-labeling. In particular, the UN's Food and Agriculture
Organization has noted that eco-labeling is one of the "least-coercive
market-based mechanisms to improve conservation outcomes" and
has promoted the international acceptance of eco-labels.8 7 Similarly,
the World Summit on Sustainable Development explicitly endorsed

83.
See OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 4 ("By 1999, it was estimated that the
lobbying campaign had ensured that more than 75% of the U.S. retail shrimp market
was dominated by the 'turtle-friendly' label.").
84.
See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Shining the Spotlight on European Union
Environmental Compliance, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 161, 168 (2007) (noting that the
Toxic Release Inventory subjects regulated entities "to the scrutiny of a variety of
external parties-including investors, community residents, and regulators-each of
whom can exert powerful pressures to improve the firm's performance").
85.
Id.
(noting
that
Environmental
Protection
Agency
officials,
environmentalists, and regulated entities "tout TRI as one of the United States' most
effective environmental laws").
86.
Id. at 169-70 (noting that Canada's pollutant registry, the National
Pollutant Release Inventory, has reduced release and transfers of pollutants by 10
percent within 8 years, but that firms with consumer market exposure reduced their
emissions more than other firms).
87.
FAO Report, supra note 29, at 54. See EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 235 (Christoph Herrmann & Jorg Philipp Terhechte

eds., 2011) (noting that in determining whether the EU Eco-labeling Programme
violates the TBT, "it should be noted on a general level that labeling is commonly seen
as a suitable and comparatively rather non-restrictive means for pursuing
environmental goals"); see also Potts & Haward, supra note 74, at 97 (discussing how
the Food and Agriculture Organization helps develop an international acceptance of
eco-labels).
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countries' adoption of eco-labeling schemes based upon PPMs,
provided that they are not motivated by protectionism.88
Arguably, in light of US-Tuna II, producers' self-reporting or
NGO eco-labeling standards are permissible alternatives to statestandardized labels under the TBT. Many scholars suggest that
private-labeling schemes are unlikely to violate the TBT, as they
would likely be considered voluntary.8 9 However, under the TBT,
private schemes may face similar compliance issues if there is any
state involvement in their development.90 If a scheme were developed
by private actors in consultation with states, aided by state funding,
or at the encouragement of states, it might fall within the TBT's
purview.9 1
Despite the likelihood that state and NGO standards may be
scrutinized by the WTO, they serve an additional purpose that
producers' self-regulatory standards cannot serve: consumer
protection. Without state oversight of their standards, labels create
potential for fraudulent misrepresentations. Consumers may be
confused by a label's use of common and vague terms, such as
environmentally friendly and green, for which there are no standard
definitions. 92 Consumers may also fall prey to deceptive claims, as
producers could exploit consumers' willingness to pay more for an
ecofriendly product. 93
Monitored enforcement of PPM-based labels is particularly
necessary because different production methods do not result in
discernible differences in quality. 94 For example, a consumer cannot
taste or see a difference between tuna that was caught by setting on
dolphins from tuna produced by more benign fishing methods. Thus,
deceptive use of self-reporting eco-labeling schemes may preserve the

88.

EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 87, at

236.
See, e.g., Potts & Haward, supra note 74, at 92 (while acknowledging that
89.
there is "debate on what criteria would labeling need to fulfill in order to avoid
contravening [WTO] rules. Voluntary private eco-labeling schemes are unlikely to be
challengeable at WTO .... ).
NGO standards face the same criticism as state standards in preventing
90.
developing countries from competing against their competitors in developed countries.
See, e.g., Gandhi, supra note 11; see also Marcy Nicks Moody, Note, WARNING: MAY
CAUSE WARMING: Potential Trade Challenges to Private Environmental Labels, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1445 (2012) (discussing how the lines between public, private, and
market activity can be difficult to draw and how state involvement affects privately
administered labels).
91.
See OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 2 ("However, to the extent that
private sector initiatives have been developed in consultation with governments (or
even received financial assistance from them) they raise the possibility of legal
challenges under WTO rules.").
92.
FAO Report, supranote 29, at 15.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 13.
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asymmetry of information between producers and consumers on the
environmental impact.95 NGO and state standards are necessary to
ensure that eco-label terms relating to PPMs are clear and that
producers follow their own labeling standards. 9 6
In achieving consumer protection, state standards have unique
advantages over NGO standards. First, they may be more effective
due to consumer trust in governmental standards.97 Consumer trust
and awareness is essential to the success of a label, as consumers are
unlikely to change their purchasing decisions otherwise.9 8 Second,
state actors' potential to control the floodgates of competing, privately
sponsored eco-labels reduces the risk that the consumers would be
inundated and confused.9 9 The long-term success of eco-labeling is
uncertain because of a number of unresolved questions, including the
competition between conflicting eco-labeling claims.' 0 0

C. The Growth of State-Backed Labeling Standards
Several states have noted that eco-labeling has the power to
efficiently promote social and environmental objectives, such as
sustainability 101 or the ethical treatment of animals, 102 while
imposing lower costs than intrusive regulation.103 States may favor
environmental disclosures, as opposed to direct regulation of PPMs,
because they inspire support from various political contingencies. 104
Economists endorse the use of eco-labels over regulations that
directly intervene in market activity because it avails more

95.
96.
97.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 13.
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 87, at

98.

Potts & Haward, supra note 74, at 96.

99.

See EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note

235.

87, at 235 (noting how state-run schemes may be more effective in curbing consumer
disorientation).
100.
See Kuminoff et al., supra note 76, at 28 (highlighting the problem of
conflicting eco-labeling claims).
101.
See FAO Report, supra note 29, at 53 (noting that many governments
recognize how eco-labeling schemes can help countries fulfill commitments on
"important environmental imperatives such as responsible fisheries and the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity").
102.
See Thomas G. Kelch, The WTO Tuna Labeling Decision and Animal Law,
8 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 121, 137 (2012) ("The EU has used a labeling scheme
to some good effect in its egg labeling scheme with data showing that consumers, in at
least Britain, have altered their behavior since the beginning of the egg labeling
scheme in that country, moving toward purchasing eggs produced under non-intensive
farming methods.").
103.
See Rechtschaffen, supra note 84, at 167 (highlighting that governments
prefer information disclosure "because it does not require a lot of governmental
resources, infrastructure, or personnel").
104.
Id. at 167.
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information to consumers.10 5 Environmental advocates support these
measures because they are effective.10 6 Market studies indicate that
companies regard negative publicity as a powerful motivation to
reduce their environmental footprint. 0 7
Perhaps the most comprehensive example of a state-backed ecolabeling scheme is the European Union's eco-label program. Through
a mechanism similar to that of the DPCIA, the European Union
approves producers' applications to use standardized labels on their
packaging if the product meets production criteria. 0 8 These criteria
focus upon the particular product's environmental impacts through
raw material extraction, production, distribution, and disposal; 0 9 the
standards are set at levels attained by the top 10 to 20 percent of
existent products.110 The success of the program is demonstrated by
the number of applications that have been filed; the European Union
granted 17,000 products the permission to use the eco-label.111
D. Opposition to State-Backed Eco-labelingStandards
In criticizing state-backed eco-labeling schemes, developing
nations commonly make two free trade arguments, both of which
were asserted by Mexico in US-Tuna II. First, forced adoption of
higher social or environmental standards is often truly spurred by
protectionism.1 12 A WTO member may adopt criteria that implicitly

105.
Id.
106.
See id. ("[E]nvironmental advocates favor [information disclosure] because
it can promote citizen empowerment and create incentives for firms to reduce harmful
activities.").
107.
Id. ("Indeed, in one compliance study, managers at a pulp and paper mill
told researchers that the sanctions the facility feared the most were the informal
sanctions imposed by the public and the media and that 'they were motivated less by
avoiding regulatory violations per se than by avoiding 'anything that could give you a
bad name."').
108.
Eco-label FAQ's, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eulenvironment/ecolabel/faq.html [http://perma.cc/L2KA-SG7G] (archived Feb. 22, 2104).
109.
Rechtschaffen, supra note 84, at 180.
110.
EU Eco-label for Businesses, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eul
environment/eco-label/eu-eco-label-for-businesses.html
[http://perma.cc/BHB5-TQPS]
(archived Feb. 22, 2014).
111.
Eco-label Facts & Figures, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eul
environmentleco-labellfacts-and-figures.html
[http://perma.cclKL4R-SXC8] (archived
Feb. 22, 2014).
112.
See Gandhi, supra note 11, at 857 (2005) ("Developing countries have
tended to take a dim view of the increased use of NGO standards . .. partly because
certain NGO standards could be disguised restrictions on trade that escape WTO
discipline only on account of their voluntary, non-governmental nature."); Sungjoon
Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the Entropic
Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INVL L. 625, 632 (2004-2005) ("[M]any developing countries have
alleged that the reality behind such rhetoric, obscured by the moral high ground,
amounts to little more than disguised protectionism.").
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discriminate against countries that do not already share similar
environmental standards or economic conditions. 113 In addition,
domestic industry groups can lobby for regulated standards requiring
PPMs that they already employ, thereby ensuring that foreign
producers will be burdened by regulatory compliance.11 4 For example,
in US-Tuna II, Mexico argued that the United States adopted the
DPCIA's regulations because U.S. producers were already in
compliance."i 5
Based upon the United States' and European Union's fickle
positions on state eco-labeling standards, this criticism appears to be
grounded in some truth.116 Rather than consistently supporting ecolabels that promote sustainability, both members have criticized the
other's standards when they disfavored their own domestic
industries.117 Critics also note the correlation of the growth of ecolabel standards with the decreased use of tariffs since the 1990s.118 It
is possible that eco-labels "gave developed country producers a
modest marketing edge to help alleviate the impact of tariff
reductions.""' 9
Second, developing nations assert that the imposition of varying
environmental regulations decreases their exports' competitive
advantage.120 Their producers are at a disadvantage in responding to
higher environmental standards because they have less access to
technology than their developed nation competitors.121 Aside from

113.
See Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrieror Trade Boon? A CriticalEvaluation of
Environmental Labeling and Its Role in the "Greening"of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J.
ENvTL. L. 205, 263 (1996) ("In selecting eco-labeling criteria that, in part, are shaped
by its own domestic needs, a country will implicitly discriminate against those
countries that do not share the same environmental standards or economic
conditions."); see also Gandhi, supra note 11, at 857 (noting that this criticism is
relevant in the debate over NGO standards).
114.
OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 3.
115.
US-Tuna II, supra note 2. See Richard Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade
Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin
Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 46 (1999) (noting that similar concerns arose
in US-Tuna I).
116.
See Shaffer, supra note 10, at 21-22 (noting that within the CTE, "the
United States and EC were concerned by each other's labeling and environmentrelated standards that could disproportionately raise their own producers' costs").
117.
See id. (discussing countries' reactions to other countries' standards that
burden foreign trade and threaten to disproportionately raise production costs).
118.
OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 4.
119.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
120.
See Potts & Haward, supra note 74, at 92 ("Developing countries do fear the
risks of certification being applied as a non-tariff trade barrier - eco-labels might
become yet another barrier of entry into the lucrative fish markets of the developed
states."); Gandhi, supra note 11, at 857 ("Developing countries have tended to take a
dim view of the increased use of NGO standards partly because they could be based
upon requirements that discriminate against their own producer.").
121.
See Cho, supra note 112, at 645 ("[P]roducers in rich countries have a much
easier time complying with higher regulatory standards than do their counterparts in
poor countries since the former enjoy higher levels of technology.").
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thwarting the WTO's purpose of encouraging free trade, such
regulatory costs could also amount to a discriminatory and excessive
burden in violation of GATT,122 as well as the United Nations' Rio
Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and
Development.1 23
E. Environmental and Consumer ProtectionConcerns as
Legitimate Policy Goals
The international community has generally accepted consumer
rights as an uncontroversial, legitimate policy goal. 124 The United
States has long aimed to protect consumers; during his presidency,
John F. Kennedy proposed that the government should protect
consumers' basic rights to safety, to be informed, to choose, and to be
heard. 125 Since that time, the international consumer rights
movement has embraced these four goals as the building blocks of
modern consumer protection. 126
Intergovernmental organizations have also recognized the
importance of states' protection of their citizens as consumers. 12 7
Notably, UN policy encourages strong domestic protection of
consumer rights and specifically included environmental concerns
within its guidelines on consumer protection in 1999. 128
Environmental and consumer rights advocates have asserted that
consumer protection and environmental concerns are inseparable.

122.
See Gandhi, supra note 11, at 864 ("In the case of manufacturers from
developing countries that can ill afford the increase costs of compliance, . . . [an ecolabeling scheme] could constitute a discriminatory market restriction.").
123.
See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1, Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992).
124.
Environmental legislation only came to the forefront of developed nations'
policy slates in the 1970s and international trade discussions in the 1980s. See Shaffer,
supra note 10, at 17-19. In contrast, consumer rights have gained international
recognition. See Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Doha Declarationand Beyond: Giving a
Voice to Non-Trade Concerns Within the WTO Trade Regime, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 95, 129-31 (2003).
125.
DiMatteo et al., supra note 124, at 129-30 (internal citation omitted).
126.
Consumer Rights, CONSUMERS INT'L, http://www.consumersinternational.org
who-we-are/consumer-rights (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) [http://perma.cc/AP22-VWAF]
(archived Feb. 16, 2014).
127.
See DiMatteo et al., supra note 124, at 130 (noting that the 1985 adoption
of the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection "effectively established international
recognition for the consumer interest," and also that "[iut is generally accepted that
domestic consumer protection . . is necessary in all economies").
128.
See E.S.C. Res. 1999/7, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1999/7 (July 26, 1999) (stating
that the promotion of "sustainable consumption" is an objective of consumer protection
and stating that "each Government should set its own priorities for the protection of
consumers in accordance with the economic, social and environmental circumstances of
the country and the needs of its population").
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Consumers International, an international lobbying group, has
specifically recognized that consumers have a right to "a healthy
environment;" they further recognize that consumers have
responsibility for ecological sustainability1 29
States' interests in consumer protection and environmental
sustainability intersect through eco-labeling standards. Stateenforced eco-labeling standards share consumer protection's general
goal of correcting market failures caused by inequality of
information. 130 State oversight ensures that consumers are not
misled by labels and that producers adhere to their own standards.
As a result, the state's oversight inspires consumers' trust in the
standard, allowing citizens to let their environmental preferences be
known through their purchasing habits.

IV. THE WTO's QUANDRY REGARDING NONTRADE INTERESTS
The WTO has not adopted an explicit policy regarding when, if
ever, environmental concerns may justify incidental barriers to
trade. 131 This failure is consistent with the organization's broader
inability to accommodate nontrade interests. 132 Scholars have
generally recognized that by tolerating such regulations, the WTO
would open up a Pandora's box; countries would suddenly be able to
justify trade barriers with any sovereign interest, ranging from labor
standards to religious or cultural traditions.' 3 3 However, Member
States have not simply abandoned nontrade policy goals. In the
decade preceding US-Tuna II, the WTO's rejection of several PPM
regulations was controversial. 134 Until the WTO can accommodate
nontrade sovereign interests, Member States will face difficulty in
complying with WTO agreements.

A. The WTO's Obstacles in Accommodating Nontrade Interests
US-Tuna II is arguably a product of the WTO political body's
inability to accommodate regulations that impose incidental, rather

129.

CONSUMERS INT'L, supra note 126.

See DiMatteo et al., supra note 124, at 131 ("Consumer protection laws
130.
allow governments to . .. redress the inequalities of information and power.").
See generally Shaffer, supra note 10 (exploring the criticisms of the WTO's
131.
treatment of trade and environmental matters).
See generally Cho, supra note 112 (finding that the WTO has failed to
132.
resolve the conflict between trade and social interests, historically reflecting a tradebias when these interests compete).
See id. at 626 (noting a "glaring tension between free trade and social
133.
regulations in areas such as environmental protection").
134.

See CHRISTIANE R. CONRAD, PROCESS AND PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS)

IN WTO LAW: INTERFACING TRADE AND SOCIAL GOALS 25-26, 30 (2011) (highlighting
the debate surrounding several PPMs).
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than protectionist, barriers to trade. Since the early 1990s,
environmental activists have criticized the WTO's inability to tolerate
environmental interests as evidence that it is dominated by business
interests. 135 However, given the disparate interests presented by
Member States, the WTO's failure to compromise is not surprising.' 36
Since its founding, the WTO has recognized that states have
legitimate interests in environmental issues that may incidentally
affect trade relations. 137 The preamble of the WTO's founding
agreement specifically noted that members could pursue
environmental protection according to their individual needs and
levels of development. 138 Moreover, GATT created a special
committee, the Group on Environmental Measures and International
Trade, to discuss these interests 40 years ago.' 3 9 The WTO continues
to officially recognize that "[s]ustainable development and protection
and preservation of the environment are fundamental goals."140 The
preambles of recent agreements, including the TBT and Sanitary &
Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS), formally recognize that each
member may "set its own standards . . . that are necessary to

preserve human, animal, and plant health and life."141
However, these documents do not reflect that members agree on
the extent to which nontrade interests may impact trade relations.1 42

135.
See Shaffer, supra note 10, at 1-2, 12 ("[Mainstream US environmental
groups'] central claim is that WTO decisions on trade and environment issues are antidemocratic and thus lack legitimacy." (internal citation omitted)); Thomas
Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment:
Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, 700 (1992) ("The GATT is depicted as a
sinister charter that allows 'big business' a free hand to plunder the bounty of the
natural world.").
136.
Schaffer, supra note 10, 17-20.
137.
See JAMES K.R. WATSON, THE WTO AND THE ENVIRONMENT: DEVELOPMENT
OF COMPETENCE BEYOND TRADE 156-60 (2013) (summarizing GATT and the WTO's
long history of recognizing the link between environmental protection and trade).
138.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, at
pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (stating that the parties agree "to protect and
preserve the environment ... in a manner consistent with [members'] respective needs
and concerns at different levels of economic development," amongst other concerns)
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
139.
See WATSON, supra note 137, at 157 (noting that when it was founded in
November 1971, the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade was
the first "institutional trade and environment body" even prior to the 1972 Stockholm
Convention on the Human Environment).
140.
Trade and Environment, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop.e/envire/ envir-e.htm [http://perma.ce/EC6J-U492] (archived Feb. 17, 2014).
141.
TBT Agreement, supra note 12, at pmbl.
142.
See Richard J. McLaughlin, Sovereignty, Utility, and Fairness: Using U.S.
Takings Law to Guide the Evolving Utilitarian Balancing Approach to Global
Environmental Disputes in the WTO, 78 OR. L. REV. 855, 864-66 (1999) (noting that
"[i]n theory GATT/WTO provides States Parties wide latitude to impose regulatory
measures within their own territory as long as the measures have a legitimate
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The WTO has made several attempts to discuss environmental issues
and adopt a uniform approach to tolerating environmental
regulations when they affect trade relations. 143 Shortly after its
founding in 1994, it created the Committee on Trade and
Environment (CTE), which was designed to address trade and
environmental issues. 144 At the Doha Conference in 1999, WTO
members intended to draft a formal agreement on environmental
around
ten
structured
negotiations
regulations. 145 They
environmental talking points, one of which was "Eco-labeling,
Packaging and Environmental Taxes."1 46 The United States, Canada,
and the European Union were the most active negotiators.1 47
Yet disagreements at the Doha Conference prevented the
adoption of meaningful provisions regarding nontrade interests.1 48
Tension resulted both from disparate interests amongst members,
particularly between developing and developed nations, and from
powerful developed nations' inconsistent domestic concerns. 149 The
United States and the European Union, the WTO's most powerful
members, failed to agree on several points due to their domestic
industries' commercial concerns. For example, the United States had
enacted the DPCIA's dolphin-safe tuna labeling scheme but asserted
at Doha that members "should not let the important principles of
GATT be trampled upon by governments trying to protect the
environment. . . ."15o The ambivalence of the United States and the
European Union was a significant obstacle to building consensus. A
positive outcome may have been achieved if their agendas had

regulatory purpose and do not treat foreign and domestic product differently" but that
when conflicts arise, this discretion is limited (internal footnote omitted)).
143.
See Shaffer, supra note 10, at 17-20 (discussing the formation of the CTE).
144.
See The Committee on Trade and Environment ('regular CTE'), WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/envir-e/wrkcommitteee.htm
[http://perma.cclYC3-TPTN] (archived Feb. 17, 2014) ("The committee's mandate is
broad, and it has contributed to identifying and understanding the relationship
between trade and the environment in order to promote sustainable development.").
145.
See Shaffer, supra note 10, at 21 (quoting GATT Council, Minutes of
Meeting: Held in the Centre Williams Rappard on 29-30 May 1991, at 14, C/M250
(June 28, 1991)).
146.
Id. at 30.
147.
Id. at 44.
148.
Instead, the members directed the CTE to continue research about ecolabelling's effect on trade. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 88 (5th ed.
2011). In the wake of the Doha agreement, scholars were ambivalent on whether the
vaguely worded reforms had created meaningful movement toward accommodating
nontrade interests. See DiMatteo et al., supra note 124, at 159 ("The issue that remains
is whether the Doha Declaration ... represent a substantial step forward .. . or a
merely a public relations instrument."). Given the Appellate Body's rejection of all
regulations that impose trade restrictions in effect in US-Tuna II, it seems that Doha's
talking points did not have lasting effect. See generally US-Tuna II AB, supra note 2.
149.
Shaffer, supra note 10, at 21-23.
150.
See id. (quoting GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre
Williams Rappard on 29-30 May 1991, at 14, C/M/250 (June 28, 1991)).
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aligned, as they successfully harnessed their clout at the same
conference to protect intellectual property rights that were opposed
by developing countries. 151
Despite the WTO's inability to adopt a formal resolution
regarding nontrade interests, contemporary academics believed that
the WTO's judicial reports indicated movement
toward
accommodating environmental interests.152 Some of the Appellate
Body's decisions in the late 1990s indicated that existing WTO
agreements might tolerate some nonprotectionist PPMs. In
particular, the Appellate Body addressed two U.S. trade embargos
against fish products that did not comply with U.S. regulations. 5 3
Despite the fact that both were struck down, the Appellate Body's
decisions implied that PPM regulations were not per se violations of
GATT.1 54
For example, in the Shrimp-Turtle case, 15 5 the Appellate Body
noted that WTO members may ban imports based not only on PPMs
but also upon the environmental policies of exporting countries. 156 In
order to justify such drastic measures, the Member State need only
show that its regulation was "'reasonably related' to a 'legitimate
policy' of conservation."1 57 The regulation would only be struck down
if its rigid approach amounted to "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination" between countries. 15s Similarly, in determining
whether the United States' favorable tax treatment of domestic wine
violated GATT, the court implied that an embargo might be valid if it
were not "enacted with the 'aim and effect' of protectionism." 5 9
The WTO also has not adopted a formal policy regarding
members' abilities to protect consumers. Unlike the United Nations,
the WTO has not taken comprehensively recognized consumer rights

151.
See id. at 82-83 ("In the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the United
States and EU successfully negotiated new WTO rules mandating the protection of
intellectual property rights, despite developing country opposition.").
152.
See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener GATT- Environmental Trade
Measures and the Shrimp-Turtle Case, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 31, 32 (2000) (using the
ruling in the "shrimp-turtle case" to illustrate the WTO's progression toward a more
liberal treatment of environmental trade measures).
153.
Id. at 34-38. See CONRAD, supra note 134, at 30 (noting that "it could be
argued that as a consequence of the Shrimp Turtle dispute it is widely accepted that
production-based trade measures are in principle justifiable under Article XX" (citation
omitted)).
154.
CONRAD, supranote 134, at 30.
155.
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 2.
156.
Chang, supra note 152, at 36-38.
157.
Id. at 39 (quoting Shrimp-Turtle, supranote 2, T 141).
158.
Id. at 39-40.
159.
Elizabeth Trujillo, Mission Possible: Reciprocal Deference Between Domestic
Regulatory Structures and the WTO, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 218-19 (2007) (quoting
Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt-Beverages,
WT/DS23/R-39S/206 (Mar. 16, 1992)).

2014/

THE EPICSTRUGGLE FOR DOLPHIN-SAFE TUNA

885

as a legitimate goal. 160 Instead, the WTO formally accommodates
health and safety measures regarding the physical characteristics of
products under the SPS 161 but has rejected consumer protection that
is aimed at requiring the extraterritorial use of particular PPMs. 162
In order to ensure such regulations are not protectionist policies in
disguise, the WTO requires that the regulation's necessity and
efficacy be supported with firm scientific evidence. 163

B. US-Tuna II: A Shift in the WTO Appellate Body's Stance on
EnvironmentalInterests
The Appellate Body's decision in US-Tuna II clarified that the
WTO's tolerance of consumer protection under the SPS agreement
does not extend to eco-labels. 164 Under the decision's reasoning, it
seems that any state-standardized labeling scheme will be considered
a technical regulation. 165 As a result, the Appellate Body's
interpretation leaves "no space for voluntary labeling schemes as

160.
See DiMatteo et al., supra note 124, at 131-32 ("One of the most pervasive
criticisms of the WTO, from a consumer perspective, is that it has no comprehensive
consumer protection policy.").
161.
The SPS permits Member States to regulate the safety of imports that may
affect human and environmental health domestically. See Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, MTN/FA II-A1A-4 (Dec. 15, 1993)
[hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/sps e/
spsagre.htm [http://perma.cc/BPN4-CCQK] (archived Feb. 17, 2014) ("No Member
should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health. . . ."); US-Tuna II AB, supra note 2 (noting that
"human health and safety" is among the "legitimate considerations" permitted by the
TBT Agreement); see also CONRAD, supra note 134, at 23 (noting that after US-Tuna I,
"[t]he legal distinction between measures linked to products and measures linked to
production gained ground and led some to consider its status as legal doctrine"
(internal citation omitted)).
162.
See SPS Agreement, supra note 161, at art. 4 (requiring that "Members
shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as equivalent,
even if these measures differ from their own").
163.
See Standards and Safety: Food, Animal and Plant Products: How Safe Is
Safe?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis-e/tif-e/
agrm4-e.htm [http://perma.cc/4L7-S6XD] (archived Feb. 17, 2014) (noting that
countries can set their own standards, but that they must be based upon science and
"should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where identical
or similar conditions prevail").
164.
See Samuel N. Lind, Eco-labels and International Trade Law: Avoiding
Trade Violations While Regulating the Environment, 8 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 113, 115-33
(discussing the ability under GATT to impose different regulatory burdens on products,
and also explaining the "dolphin safe" tuna labeling program and how it relates to
mandatory labeling restrictions); see also CONRAD, supra note 134, at 30 ("[Ilt seems to
be widely believed that the basic lines along which PPM measures are assessed under
WTO law have been established.").
165.
See Kelch, supra note 102, at 136 (discussing the Panel decision in USTuna).
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standards." 166 The decision closes the possibility that statestandardized labels might be considered voluntary under WTO
agreements, a belief that was previously held by some
intergovernmental institutions. 167 For example, in 2000, the Fishing
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations issued guidance
on eco-labeling schemes and WTO agreements. It noted that
"voluntary schemes" such as the DPCIA, which give producers
complete discretion to join a scheme and consumers to choose a
labeled product, do not appear to violate the TBT or GATT. 168
The Appellate Body's broad interpretation of the TBT may
indicate that it is returning to its trade-centric roots and has
abandoned its previous efforts toward accommodating nontrade
interests.1 69 Some academics have found US-Tuna II to be consistent
with the founding purposes of GATT. 170 Indeed, US-Tuna II's
reasoning is more consistent with earlier, pre-WTO rulings that
GATT members could not discriminate against imports based upon
their origin's domestic policies.17 1 Early Panel decisions also implied
that PPM regulations would be subject to strict scrutiny under WTO
agreements. 172
In any event, US-Tuna II's reasoning amounts to a rejection of
previous dicta indicating that a PPM regulation might survive if it is
not based upon a protectionist purpose. This test emerged in the
Shrimp-Turtle case, which may now be regarded as the high-water
mark of the Appellate Body's concern for nontrade interests. In USTuna II, the Panel employed the reasoning suggested in ShrimpTurtle; it held that because the DPCIA was not enacted to serve a
discriminatory purpose, it did not violate TBT Article 2.1. 173

166.
Panel Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, I VII.52, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15,
2011) [hereinafter US-Tuna Panel Report].
167.
See Potts & Haward, supra note 74, at 92 (citing OECD REPORT, supra note
76, at 12) (noting that eco-labels that were granted by public organizations were
"usually applied voluntarily").
168.
See FAO Report, supra note 29, at 58, 63 (relying upon the Appellate Body's
finding in Tuna I that the U.S. 'dolphin safe' tuna labeling scheme was voluntary).
169.
See, e.g., Cho, supra note 112, at 651-52 (noting that "under the new WTO
system," the Appellate Body has concentrated upon Member States' protectionist
motives in enacting and applying regulations based upon nontrade interests).
170.
See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 135, at 710 ("The panel's decision ... is
based on a literal reading of GATT Article III.").
171.
See CONRAD, supra note 134, at 21 (noting that in a study on "Trade and
the Environment," the GATT Secretariat stated that it was "not possible under GATT's
rules to make access to one's own market dependent on the domestic environmental
policies or practices of the exporting country" (internal citation omitted)).
172.
See id. at 30 ("[Ilt seems to be widely believed that the basic lines along
which PPM measures are assessed under WTO law have been established.").
173.
US-Tuna Panel Report, supra note 166, 1 VII.87.
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Nevertheless, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel's ruling. 174 Thus,
the Appellate Body strongly departed from its previous
recommendation of considering a member's actual motivations in
enacting legislation.
The Appellate Body may have applied a stringent analysis
because the DPCIA was analyzed under the TBT, a treaty that was
designed to combat nonprotectionist, but costly, technical barriers to
trade. 175 However, such a strong divergence from the Appellate
Body's test for compliance under the SPS is questionable for two
reasons. First, both the SPS and TBT pursue the same purpose:
ensuring the elimination of domestic regulations that intend to or
actually create barriers to trade. 176 Second, both agreements
recognize that members have legitimate interests in protecting the
environment.' 7 7 It seems, therefore, that the WTO judicial bodies
should adopt a similar approach when evaluating whether a
regulation violates either the SPS or the TBT. In particular, they
should consistently weigh whether a member's nonprotectionist
interest is the actual motivation behind the regulation.' 7 8
In addition, both the Appellate Body and Panel scrutinized the
United States' scientific evidence regarding the necessity of a more
stringent regulatory standard for ETP tuna. The findings easily

298 (applying the analysis of
174.
Compare US-Tuna II AB, supra note 2,
whether the regulation was "even-handed in the way in which they address the risks to
dolphins arising . . . in different areas of the ocean"), with Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 2,
1 186 (finding that the United States' rigid categorization of countries amounted to
"arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination" between countries where the same
conditions prevail because the United States did not have any evidence for difference in
risks between countries).
FAO Report, supra note 29, at 60. See Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements,
175.
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/ursum-e.htm#dAgreement
[http://perma.cclH3P5-B9DR] (archived Feb. 17, 2014) (noting that an "innovative feature"
of the TBT over GATT was that it covered PPMs).
See WTO Technical Information, supra note 46 (citing the "[h]igh number of
176.
technical regulations and standards" as a reason for the TBT); Trujillo, supra note 159,
at 215 ("In writing Article III [of GATT], the drafters sought to prevent internal
measures that would discriminate between imported and 'like' domestic products,
creating a 'constructive tariff on imports and effectively benefiting domestic
producers." (quoting JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 279-80

(1969))).
177.
See TBT Agreement, supra note 12, at pmbl. ("[N]o country should be
prevented from taking measures necessary . . . for the protection of human, animal,
and plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive
practices . . . ."); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1974, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (permitting trade actions that are
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health").
178.
Cf. Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) (reviewing for a violation of SPS
agreement, the Panel conducted an in-depth review of whether scientific data
supported the EU's ban on importation of beef produced through use of growth
hormones in determining whether the legislation had a valid, non-protectionist
interest).
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passed the U.S. courts' rational basis standard of review, but the
Appellate Body did not find the same evidence convincing. This
disparity in standard of review requires that a WTO member's
legislature collect enough scientific evidence to satisfy not only their
domestic standard of judicial review but also that of any future WTO
adjudication. As the WTO's adjudicatory bodies do not follow
precedent, it will be difficult to anticipate what this requires. 7 9 In
addition, the Appellate Body's scrutiny is misplaced because it
exceeds the court's expertise; the WTO admits that its adjudicatory
bodies' specialized knowledge relates only to trade, rather than
science. 180
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: REINTERPRETING THE TBT's APPLICATION TO
STATE ECO-LABEL STANDARDS AND MONETARY AID

The WTO has an interest in promoting decisions that are
popular amongst its members' citizens and NGOs in order to protect
its institutional integrity.181 Both the WTO and individual judges
wish to protect the WTO's overall credibility and legitimacy, both of
which may be compromised by controversial judicial decisions.182 This
risk is particularly acute in the environmental arena. After its
controversial invalidations of U.S. marine life protections in the
1990s, the WTO experienced unprecedented backlash by individuals
and special interest groups. 8 3 Activists accused the WTO of being an
anti-environmental body, and years of poor publicity led to
widespread belief that the WTO was the puppet of commercial
interests.184 If they face popular opposition, members may be tempted
to disregard WTO adjudicatory decisions.' 85
This potential outcome would prolong a pattern of members
failing to amend their domestic policies in the face of WTO
179.
See supra Section IV.b.
180.
See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 148, at 88 (describing the
nature of work done by the Trade and Environment Committee).
181.
See Cho, supra note 112, at 627 (describing the competing interests that the
WTO must balance in order to effectively achieve its goals).
182.
See KRIKORIAN, supranote 24, at 208 (discussing tensions inherent in WTO
adjudication).
183.
See Cho, supra note 112, at 625-26 (noting that protests regarding the
Seattle round drew 50,000-100,000 participants and united unlikely interest groups
between "turtles and Teamsters").
184.
See Shaffer, supra note 10, at 1-3 (presenting several WTO criticisms).
185.
For example, Europe continued its embargo of beef from cattle raised with
growth hormones even after the WTO Appellate Body ruled that its ban violated GATT
Article XX. See generally RENPE JOHNSON & CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV., THE U.S.-EU BEEF HORMONE DISPUTE (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40449.pdf (discussing the EU's continued ban on
imports of hormone-treated meat).
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adjudicatory body reports. WTO adjudications have had relatively
limited effect upon the domestic policies of Member States. 8 6 After a
report is adopted, states can choose to change their laws to literally
comply with the decision without actually changing domestic policy or
can simply opt for a lower cost penalty.18 7 Given the limited sanctions
that the adjudicatory bodies can impose, these costs are often
small.' 8 8

A. Enacting Change Without Amending the WTO Agreements
The WTO's treatment of regulations that differentiate between
PPMs, rather than an end product's features, does not allow Member
States to adequately pursue legitimate environmental objectives.18 9
Amending the WTO's current stance on eco-labels and other PPM
regulations could take one of the following three approaches: 1)
members amending the text of GATT; 2) members formally adopting
authoritative interpretations of the current GATT articles, including
the TBT; or 3) altering the interpretation of GATT articles by WTO
adjudicatory bodies on a case-by-case basis. 9 0 Given the "apparent
impossibility" of members agreeing upon the pursuit of
environmental objectives, alternatives should be explored.1 9 As a
result, this Note suggests that the WTO's political body abandon its
previous attempts to achieve formal principles that guide
environmental legislation for the time being.
Some scholars have suggested that member consensus, either
through amending the GATT text or adopting interpretations of
existent language, is the only legitimate option for change. The
decision to ever place nontrade interests before international free
trade is a sensitive issue and therefore should result only from
member consensus. 192 Some scholars question whether WTO
adjudicatory bodies have the ability to make rules at all, believing

186.
See KRIKORIAN, supra note 24, at 203 (recognizing practical limitations of
the WTO's adjudicatory power).
187.
See id. at 206-07 (describing how states sometimes circumvent WTO
decisions).
188.
See id. at 211 (illustrating the effects of limited sanctions).
189.
Cf. Trujillo, supra note 159, at 229 ("[I1n applying Article III [of GATT], the
WTO Panels stray so far in the direction of free trade that they ignore the possibility of
a legitimate domestic regulatory policy that (1) though discriminatory, places on
'incidental burdens' on free trade; and (2) arises from domestic industries traditionally
regulated or 'partially' regulated.").
190.
See CONRAD, supra note 134, at 438 (laying out the three potential
amendment approaches).
191.
Id.
192.
See id. ("Many scholars argue that the interrelations between international
trade and non-economic policies are of great importance and therefore require political
negotiations and a solution supported by all WTO members." (internal citation
omitted)).
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such powers should be reserved for diplomatic bodies.1 93 However,
adherence to this principle will likely result in a continued stalemate
on environmental issues; given the difficulties the members faced at
Doha, adoption of GATT amendments will not likely be an easy
option. Similarly, adoption of authoritative interpretations by the
Ministerial Conference would be equally as difficult, as it would
require consensus by three-fourths of WTO members.1 94
The WTO's environmental experts, the CTE, are unlikely to
easily change the WTO's approach to eco-labeling, given the WTO's
organizational structure. Though the Doha Declaration mandates
that the CTE continue to research eco-labeling throughout its normal
meetings, the committee can use its findings only to make
recommendations to other committees that interpret the SPS and
TBT.195 Additionally, the Technical Barriers to Trade Committee was
given the same charge at Doha and is considered by members to be a
more effective forum for discussing eco-labeling standards.' 9 6 The
overlapping jurisdiction may make it more difficult for environmental
experts' opinions to be heard and ultimately prevail.
Given the structural difficulties in formally changing WTO's
stance on eco-labels, the Appellate Body should enact change on a
flexible, case-by-case basis.' 9 7 Unlike the first two options, change
through the Appellate Body has the advantage of not requiring the
formal consent of most Member States on a single provision. 198
Instead, any dispute's Panel need only balance the trade and
nontrade interests of the particular parties before them. Moreover,
the vague language within the TBT provides a statutory foundation
that allows for judicial interpretation.199

See WATSON, supra note 137, at 32 (noting that the Chicago School of
193.
Economics believes the WTO should be closed off from environmental interests and
that rule making power should be limited to diplomatic bodies).
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 138, at art. X (describing the
194.
amendment process).
See WATSON, supra note 137, at 173-74 ("The CTE can only make
195.
recommendations that can be adopted by the committees responsible for the operation
of the SPS and TBT agreements.").
196.
See id. at 174 (discussing the superiority of the TBT committee as "the
place to negotiate" on the issue of labeling).
197.
See CONRAD, supra note 134, at 439 (delving deeply into potential
amendment process to increase the effectiveness of WTO adjudicatory bodies in this
area).
See id. at 439 (noting the preference for this option because "the required
198.
changes can indeed be achieved on the basis of the existing agreements" and "[s]ince
the large WTO membership and higher likelihood of political impasse often prevent
negotiated solutions").
The TBT only requires that regulations "do not create unnecessary
199.
obstacles to international trade" and are not applied in a manner that results in
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination." See TBT Agreement, supra note 12, at
pmbl., art. 2.2 (emphasis added).
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This approach will require that the WTO judicial bodies step
back from the US-Tuna II effects test to determine whether an ecolabel violates the TBT. The departure would not be insignificant; the
Appellate Body's adopted report will likely remain persuasive
authority for the WTO's next interpretation of the TBT.200 The WTO
states on its website that if a previous report's interpretation of a
WTO rule is persuasive, then future decisions will likely follow it. 201
This comports with judicial systems' general esteem for
predictability. 202 However, consistent with the general practice of
international courts, the Appellate Body does not create binding
precedent.203 The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding states
that adjudicatory bodies do not have the power to create rules. 204
Thus, the Appellate Body has the necessary power to depart from its
earlier decisions when required by justice or common sense. 205
Other scholars have suggested that the WTO adopt the
narrowest possible interpretation of its own jurisdiction over
environmental controversies. This would likely be an effective
measure in combatting the extension of WTO jurisdiction over
controversies regarding labeling standards created by NGOs. 206 It is
also a solution that the WTO itself indirectly proposes to its members;
if a trade dispute arises because a country is complying with an
outside environmental agreement to which both states are parties,
the parties should settle that dispute through the environmental
agreement. 207 However, where the parties to the controversy cannot
rely upon another adjudicatory body with more environmental
expertise, the WTO may be the only forum available. In those
situations, the WTO has no choice but to exercise jurisdiction, despite
its lack of expertise on environmental concerns. 208
Some critics have suggested that a separate intergovernmental
body for environmental issues, such as a World Environmental

200.
See WATSON, supranote 137, at 91 (noting that the Appellate Body adopted
reports "have strong persuasive power and may be viewed as a form of non-binding
precedent").
201.
Id. at 90.
202.
Id.
203.
See id. at 74, 89 (noting that judges have the right to depart from
persuasive precedent and that if the WTO were to adopt precedent, it would depart
from traditions of public international law).
204.
DSU, supra note 69, at art 3.5 (noting that all arbitration awards "shall be
consistent" with the WTO agreements and "shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing
to any Member under those agreements, nor impede the attainment of any objective of
those agreements").
205.
Id.
206.
See, e.g., Moody, supra note 90, at 1431-32 (proposing this solution in
determining if the WTO has jurisdiction over controversies regarding NGO's
environmental label standards).
207.
See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 148, at 67 (identifying the
appropriate dispute resolution forums for such situations).
208.
Id. at 65 ("The WTO is only competent to deal with trade.").
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Organization, might lead to more effective environmental
commitments.2 0 9 However, given the WTO's difficulty in establishing
consensus even between developed organizations, the impact that
such an organization would have is questionable. 210 Providing an
additional forum is unlikely to eradicate the source of international
dissolution on environmental issues: the competing commercial and
environmental interests of states on both domestic and international
levels. 211

B. Proposed JudicialReview: DistinguishingEnvironmentalfrom
ProtectionistMotivations
This Note suggests that the Appellate Body interpret the TBT in
a manner that recognizes environmental concerns as legitimate
domestic policy goals, as stated in the Doha Declaration. 212 In
determining whether eco-labeling standards violate the TBT, the
WTO judicial bodies should focus upon rooting out covert
protectionism. 213 Accordingly, the WTO judicial body should only hold
state-standardized eco-label schemes invalid under the TBT if they
are based upon protectionist motives. 2 14 This inquiry upholds the
TBT's central purpose of eradicating trade barriers driven by
protectionism but veiled by the assertion of other legitimate policy
goals.215 This will require a departure from the WTO adjudicative
branch's approach in determining the validity of the DPCIA under
the TBT and a return to the reasoning it laid out in its decisions in
the late 1990s. 216

209.
See, e.g., Why Greens Should Love Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1999, at
18 (commenting on how "greens" are increasingly resorting to the WTO to gain binding
decisions that are not really about trade at all, and so might be more appropriately
handled by a separate environment-focused body, a "World Environment
Organization").
210.
See Schaffer, supra note 10, at 85 (discussing the calls for and possibility of
a World Environmental Organization).
211.
Id. at 85-86.
212.
See DiMatteo et al., supra note 124, at 157 (noting that the Doha
Declaration "recognizes a number of [nontrade concerns]" including the environment).
See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade
213.
Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 566-72 (2000) (explaining the advantages of the
"antidiscrimination model that the WTO has chosen to address national regulations
that potentially interfere with free trade").
214.
Cf. Trujillo, supra note 159, at 228-29 (proposing that the WTO adopt a
similar approach in interpreting GATT as that in U.S. Commerce Clause common law).
215.
See Standards and Safety: Technical Regulations and Standards, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto e/whatis -e/tif -e/agrm4_e.htm#TRS
[http://perma.cc/JL2-RT2Z] (archived Feb. 16, 2014) ("The Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement (TBT) tries to ensure that regulations, standards, testing and certification
procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles [to trade].").
216.
In the 1990s, the WTO Appellate Body focused upon whether "a given
domestic regulation was applied consistently and evenhandedly or whether it respected
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One particular virtue of this approach is that it falls squarely
within the expertise of the adjudicatory bodies. The WTO judges are
well-placed to evaluate whether legislation is covertly protectionist,
as they have conducted similar analyses in several cases. 2 17 In each
case, the Panel should complete a full review of the legislative
history. Just as it would in assessing the value of safety regulations
for imports under the SPS, 218 the WTO judicial body should require
the challenged party to demonstrate that the regulation serves its
purported purpose. This would most likely involve an in-depth
analysis of the legislative history of the standards, including what
forces inspired their enactment.
C. Requiringa Reasonable Foundationof Scientific Support
In determining whether legislation is based upon legitimate,
nontrade interests, the judges may consider whether the country that
passed environmental legislation considered scientific evidence. This
comports with the WTO's requirement that its members provide as
much information as possible regarding their environmental policies
to prevent the appearance of covert protectionism. 2 19 However, the
court's standard of review should be considerably lower than that
required in US-Tuna II. It should only require that the Member
State's interpretation of data reasonably supports the efficacy of the
chosen regulation. As demonstrated by the divergence of opinion
between Congress and the Appellate Body in US-Tuna II, scientific
data can be interpreted in many ways, depending upon the values of
the person considering it. If WTO judges do not leave room for a
variety of perspectives, then they risk striking popular legislation
that is not protectionist.
If the challenged eco-label regulation differentiates based upon
country of origin, then the WTO judicial body should require
supporting scientific evidence that justifies such geographical
discrimination. Similarly, regional discrepancies within regulations
may signal that the challenged legislation's true purpose is to favor
some nations over others. 22 0 Under this approach, the Panel and

fundamental principles of law, rather than investigating, on its own accord, whether
the regulation's substance was necessary or related to the achievement of the
regulating state's social policy goals." Cho, supranote 112, at 651.
217.
See id. at 651-52 (describing the difficulty involved in distinguishing
between legitimate environmental regulation and "protectionism," and noting a
number of cases in which the WTO Appellate Body has done such); see, e.g., Appellate
Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products,WT/DS58/ABR (Oct. 12, 1998).
218.
See DiMatteo et al., supra note 124, at 132 (explaining procedures under
the SPS).
219.
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supranote 148, at 70.
220.
See US-Tuna II AB, supra note 2, 1 241 (noting Mexico's argument that the
United States' regulation was intended to discriminate based on country of origin).
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Appellate Body in US-Tuna II were correct in requiring scientific
data that justified the different regional regulations. However, once
the United States presented that evidence, the judges should have
reviewed Congress's findings for reasonableness.
More importantly, WTO judges should not strictly scrutinize
scientific evidence justifying the member's environmental concerns. If
its judges continue to apply the US-Tuna II analysis, the WTO risks
striking down laws based upon reasonable interpretations. US-Tuna
II demonstrates the potential for disagreement in interpreting close
cases; while Congress found that changing the DPCIA was
unnecessary because the commissioner could not find evidence that
the regulation was not justified, the WTO found an absence of
evidence that the regulation was justified. Instead, the WTO should
return to the relaxed inquiry used in Shrimp-Turtle, when the
Appellate Body noted that a Member State need only show that its
regulation was "reasonably related . .. to a legitimate policy" of

conservation. 221
Also, strict scrutiny might prevent member nations from taking
precautionary approaches regarding emerging environmental issues,
especially those that cannot be studied through the use of short-term
data. 222 This hurdle to innovative regulation arose in cases when the
Appellate Body interpreted the SPS. Though the agreement requires
members to provide scientific evidence supporting the need for their
health and safety regulations, the SPS allows for Member States to
take "precautionary measures" temporarily before scientific evidence
uniformly confirms a health risk. 223 In practice, however, it seems
that this precautionary principle is not followed by the WTO
judiciary. In a notable example, both a WTO Panel and the Appellate
Body rejected the European Union's ban on beef produced through
the use of hormones; though the European Union believed these
hormones would have long-term effects on human health that were

221.
See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 2, T 141 ("The means are, in principle,
reasonably related to the ends. The means and ends relationship between Section 609
and the legitimate policy of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species,
is observably a close and real one . . . .").
222.
The WTO's requirement of firm scientific evidence in the US-EU
controversy over use of hormones in beef production demonstrates how Member States
would be unable to assert interests in preventing environmental concerns before full
effects are known. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products, 46, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16,
1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter EC Meat Measures Case].
223.
See SPS Agreement, supra note 161, at art. 5.7 ("In cases where relevant
scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information ... . In such
circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a
more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure
accordingly within a reasonable period of time.").

2014/

THE EPIC STRUGGLE FOR DOLPHIN-SAFE TUNA

895

not yet known, the WTO struck the ban down because the European
Union failed to produce a firm body of evidence. 224 Similar results
would likely arise in many other controversial environmental topics,
such as emerging regulations on carbon dioxide emissions.
D. Awarding Monetary Aid to Unsuccessful ChallengingParties
To prevent any trade-restrictive effects of valid eco-labeling
schemes, the WTO should consider awarding monetary aid to
members who are unsuccessful in challenging the eco-labeling
scheme. Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, WTO judicial
bodies may approve compensatory damages only after they find a
regulation not to comply with WTO obligations.2 25 This Note suggests
that when the WTO upholds eco-labeling schemes that lead to
incidental barriers to trade, monetary damages should be available to
members who experience high barriers to compliance. These
monetary damages would come from the successful, regulating
member. Up-front monetary aid would potentially reduce the
challenging member's technological or financial obstacles to
compliance, while permitting the regulating member to achieve its
environmental goals.
Such an award should be based upon a party's demonstrated
financial inability to comply with the other party's environmental
regulations. The WTO judicial body should review evidence presented
by the challenging party demonstrating: 1) its noncompliant
industry's current practices; and 2) its inability to overcome the
financial or technological burden of compliance. For example, in USTuna II, Mexico would have satisfied the first prong because it
demonstrated that two-thirds of its fishing vessels used fishing
methods that render products ineligible for the United States'
dolphin-safe label.2 26 However, Mexico did not provide evidence on
why its fishing vessels could not switch to other fishing methods. It
could have satisfied the second prong by quantifying the financial
cost of switching to compliant fishing methods, or by showing that its
industry does not have access to technology that enables the switch.
In cases where monetary aid is appropriate, it should be granted
upon the condition that the challenging member uses the award to
comply with the eco-labeling standards. The restriction serves several
purposes. First, the award of aid builds upon the WTO's suggestion
that members grant developing countries financial and technological
224.
See, e.g., EC Meat Measures Case, supra note 222, at 46 (striking down the
EU's prohibition of beef produced with growth hormones, as scientific research did not
support their assertion of health and safety impacts upon human health).
DSU, supra note 69, at art. 22.1 ("[N]either compensation nor the
225.
suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a
recommendation .... Compensation is voluntary .....
234.
US-Tuna II AB, supranote 2,
226.
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assistance to adopt environmentally friendly PPMs, rather than
imposing regulations. 227 Second, the question removes some of the
academic debate regarding whether private parties or Member States
should be the recipients of monetary awards. 228 The states
themselves could determine how to best distribute the aid to their
industries. Third, the limited remedy might serve a gatekeeping
function by discouraging members from challenging regulations with
which they do not wish to comply. In these cases, states will know ex
post that the case will not result in the invalidation of the regulation.
If adopted as this Note outlines, monetary aid should reduce the
incidental effect of environmental regulations as technical barriers to
trade. First, it should increase the ability of developing nations'
industries to compete with producers in developed nations. Second,
this monetary aid would directly combat the concern of developing
nations that eco-labels could serve as covert protectionist legislation.
Potential monetary liability may deter members from passing
protectionist policies dressed up as environmental legislation, or
encourage the adoption of multiparty environmental agreements over
unilateral regulation. This is a particularly important feature, as
evidence suggests that even when the WTO strikes down legislation,
developing countries do not enforce retaliatory trade sanctions
against its larger trade partners.2 2 9
Remedial aid may also further the regulating state's legitimate
environmental goals. Monetary aid should increase the ability and
willingness of developing nations to adopt more environmentally
friendly production methods. This should appease environmentalists
and could chip away at the WTO's reputation of having its own tradedriven, anti- environmental agenda.
Admittedly, there are two potential drawbacks to this proposal.
First, it would require an amendment through the WTO's diplomatic
bodies, which this Note found to be unrealistic in the context of
formally accommodating state eco-label standards or environmental
regulations more generally. 230 WTO judicial bodies could grant aid
only if they are given the power by an amendment to the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. There is some indication that this

227.

UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 148, at 66.

228.

See Alan 0. Sykes, Optimal Sanctions in the WTO: The Case for Decoupling

(And the Uneasy Case for the Status Quo), in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 340 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds.,
2010) (explaining the debate over monetary awards to member states).

229.

See Kyle Bagwell et al., The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute

Settlement, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 395,
397-98 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2006) (noting that between
1995 and 2003, not one developing country implemented countermeasures "to induce
compliance even when faced with non-implementation").

230.

See supra Part V.
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recommendation has gained traction, as it has already been posed by
African members to reform the implementation devices available to
the WTO. 23 1
Second, monetary aid awards may face criticisms applied to all
WTO monetary awards regarding enforcement and ease of
calculation. Enforcement is unfortunately an issue for all WTO
remedies, as WTO adjudication is not binding upon parties. 232 One
way to combat such uncertainty would be to amend the Dispute
Settlement Understanding to make monetary aid awards binding.
Scholars have often suggested that binding damages are a feasible
award in WTO adjudications. 233 Also, monetary aid should be easier
to calculate than the compensatory damages that the WTO already
awards. For example, critics have noted that compensatory damages
are difficult to implement in the context of trade violations because
calculations depend upon value judgments. For example, a Panel
awarding compensatory damages must decide whether to calculate
solely for past harm or include an estimate for uncertain future
harm. 234 Monetary aid's magnitude is simpler to calculate, as it is
based only upon the prospective costs of implementing compliance.

VI. CONCLUSION
The decades-old battle between environmental and trade
protections seems to inevitably lead to defeat, both for WTO members
and the organization itself. Neither group has ignored the public
outcry that resulted when the WTO struck down the United States'
monumental environmental regulations in the 1990s. Yet, as
evidenced in the Doha negotiations, WTO members face perhaps
insurmountable difficulties in adopting a uniform accommodation
policy for environmental regulations. The stalemate reflects not only
the inherent conflict between these two interests but also the fact
that a member's legislation often reflects a domestic tug of war
between these two interests. Therefore, any realistic proposal for
WTO reform must accommodate reality: its members are most likely
to agree only if reform provides them protection when they both
oppose or assert environmental legislation.

Bagwell et al., supra note 229, at 396.
231.
See id. at 396-97 (discussing the implementation process for WTO
232.
obligations).
See William J. Davey, Sanctions in the WTO: Problems and Solutions, in
233.
THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT,
supra note 228, at 360 (noting that compensatory damages awarded by WTO tribunals
should be binding).
See Sykes, supra note 228, at 340 (raising questions about the calculation of
234.
compensatory damages for trade violations).
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This Note's two suggested reforms attempt to do exactly that.
The first recommends that instead of requiring the WTO diplomatic
body to achieve consensus through formally amending its
agreements, its adjudicatory bodies instead reinterpret what the
members have already passed. WTO judges should acknowledge that
the preambles of WTO agreements and the Doha Declaration
acknowledge that Member States have legitimate interests in
environmental concerns; a reasonable interpretation of this language
is that members may justifiably legislate protections for nontrade
interests, even when they result in incidental effects on international
trade.
Second, this Note's suggestion that the WTO judiciary grant
monetary aid offers a carrot for the losing party of an eco-labeling
controversy. This measure may face great opposition because it would
increase the WTO's ability to impose binding decisions. However, the
availability of aid would be limited to cases where the challenging
party has proven that it faces an insurmountable burden to
compliance. In addition, awards of monetary aid would promote the
WTO's general objectives of decreasing technological barriers to trade
and supporting legitimate environmental protection. Not only will aid
enable developing nations to comply with stringent environmental
standards, but WTO members may be deterred from enacting
protectionist measures if they know they will later be required to aid
efforts of foreign industry to compete.
The proposed solution faces two practical hurdles that should not
be ignored. First, the Appellate Body may be reluctant to depart from
its nonbinding, but persuasive, precedent in US-Tuna II. However,
given the public outcry following its decisions in US-Tuna I and the
Shrimp-Turtle case, the WTO should support the reinterpretation of
the TBT if it leads to amelioration of the WTO's perceived legitimacy.
Second, any reform of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding
will require the consensus of Member States. Such reform will likely
face significant opposition, given members' continuing fear of losing
sovereignty. However, such concerns should be somewhat assuaged
because monetary concessions will lead to members' greater freedom
to protect nontrade interests without risking trade sanctions.
Despite the WTO's inability to adopt a formal approach to
accommodating nontrade interests, eco-labels and environmental
regulations continue to grow amongst WTO members. Not only does
the WTO's strict promotion of trade interests alone compromise the
ability of members to pass popular legislation, but it threatens the
WTO's reputation as a relevant and authoritative international
organization. This Note hopes to contribute to the discussions on
reforming both the WTO's stance on environmental interests and its
enforcement mechanisms. The combined reinterpretation of the TBT
and the award of monetary aid are reforms that are not only effective
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but also could attract universal support from Member States battling
environmental and trade interests.
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